Sunday, November 6, 2011
Yokoyamas second graphic novel, the recently translated Garden, also follows the logic of motion from beginning to end, of journey to destination. But in this book Yokoyama complicates things: Garden also begins with a destination, and for over 300 pages readers are invited to wonder if the journey it depicts is the same utilitarian movement through space depicted in Travel, or an end unto itself.
Garden begins with a strong echo of Platos Allegory of the Cave. A handful of the artists humanoid, fashion-forward characters stand assembled before a guard wearing a mask printed with a pattern that encourages the eyes to unfocus, and are denied entrance to the garden that memories of Travel suggest they have come a long way to see. Luckily, there is a breach in the wall that sections off the garden from the outside world an outside world, crucially, that we are never allowed to see. By the end of page one, the characters we follow for the entirety of the narrative are through the wall and into the garden.
We will not see them leave. For the rest of the book, the characters negotiate ever more complex and physically demanding man-made topographical features, frequently risking life and limb without a mention of the fact that they are doing so. The dialogue betrays no interiority whatsoever, with completely interchangeable voices alternating between describing the bizarre sights their owners are witnessing and speculating on their purposes and the methods of their creation. Yokoyamas fanciful setup nails the basic absurdity of modern leisure: the most privileged among us the ones with the lives we believe are ideal work by staring at screens, and recreate by climbing mountains.
Garden is more than satire, however, and Yokoyamas sights are set much higher than the follies of vacationing. The nature of the obstacles his band of wanderers encounter progresses slowly but surely over the course of the book. Waterfalls of simple rubber balls and fountains made of stacked bowls give way to planters made of automobiles and resting areas constructed from airplane parts. Soon the terrain is incorporating giant paper pyramids, a winding maze of irrigation channels that forces its occupants to literally get their feet wet, and motorized blocks of rock that ferry riders up grooves cut into the side of mountains.
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
Monday, June 6, 2011
Part of the AFI 100 Years… series, AFI’s 100 Years…100 Stars is a list of the top 50 greatest screen legends of American cinema, 25 male and 25 female. The list was unveiled by the American Film Institute on a June 15, 1999 CBS special hosted by Shirley Temple, with 50 current actors making the presentations.
The American Film Institute defined an “American screen legend” as an actor or a team of actors with a significant screen presence in American feature-length (40 min) films whose screen debut occurred in or before 1950, or whose screen debut occurred after 1950 but whose death has marked a completed body of work.
To date, of the fifty stars listed only five are still alive: two men, (Sidney Poitier and Kirk Douglas), and three women (Shirley Temple, Lauren Bacall, and Sophia Loren). At the time the list was first unveiled, two men, (Marlon Brando and Gregory Peck) and two women (Katharine Hepburn and Elizabeth Taylor) were also living.
|1.||Humphrey Bogart||1.||Katharine Hepburn|
|2.||Cary Grant||2.||Bette Davis|
|3.||James Stewart||3.||Audrey Hepburn|
|4.||Marlon Brando||4.||Ingrid Bergman|
|5.||Fred Astaire||5.||Greta Garbo|
|6.||Henry Fonda||6.||Marilyn Monroe|
|7.||Clark Gable||7.||Elizabeth Taylor|
|8.||James Cagney||8.||Judy Garland|
|9.||Spencer Tracy||9.||Marlene Dietrich|
|10.||Charlie Chaplin||10.||Joan Crawford|
|11.||Gary Cooper||11.||Barbara Stanwyck|
|12.||Gregory Peck||12.||Claudette Colbert|
|13.||John Wayne||13.||Grace Kelly|
|14.||Laurence Olivier||14.||Ginger Rogers|
|15.||Gene Kelly||15.||Mae West|
|16.||Orson Welles||16.||Vivien Leigh|
|17.||Kirk Douglas||17.||Lillian Gish|
|18.||James Dean||18.||Shirley Temple|
|19.||Burt Lancaster||19.||Rita Hayworth|
|20.||The Marx Brothers||20.||Lauren Bacall|
|21.||Buster Keaton||21.||Sophia Loren|
|22.||Sidney Poitier||22.||Jean Harlow|
|23.||Robert Mitchum||23.||Carole Lombard|
|24.||Edward G. Robinson||24.||Mary Pickford|
|25.||William Holden ||25.||Ava Gardner|
Thursday, June 2, 2011
So what causes it? First, Moskowitz and Wertheim rule out the conventional explanations, starting with the support of the home fans. How do you isolate the effect of the crowd on a team’s performance? They do it by comparing how well home and away players perform when faced with identical tasks, save only for the presence or absence of a hostile audience. Take basketball: when a player is fouled, he (or she) is awarded free throws at the basket from 15 feet. No one is allowed to interfere, apart from the home fans, who can do what they like to put off the opposition. If you’ve ever seen an NBA game in the States you’ll know this often includes shaking rattles and waving balloons from behind the basket. The result? Nothing. The stats show that away players perform just as well as home players from the free-throw line, despite all the barracking. The same applies to goal-kicking in American football, and penalty shoot-outs in our version. The home side has no better chance of winning at penalties than the away team. Home fans often think they can help the ball into the net with their hushed support, or keep it out with their whistling derision. It seems they might as well save their breath.
If it’s not the fans, maybe it’s the travel. Away teams often have to cross long distances (especially in the US), sleep in unfamiliar beds, and deal with all the discomfort of being far from home. This one is easy to disprove. The record of away teams across all sports is just as bad in local derbies, despite the fact that getting to the ground is no more inconvenient than for the home players. Everton’s and Liverpool’s grounds are less than a mile apart – but Everton are still much more likely to beat Liverpool when they don’t have to make the short journey to Anfield. The historical data back this up. Travelling conditions for top athletes have got immeasurably better over time – where once it might have been as slow and difficult for them to get around as for the rest of us, now it tends to be pampered luxury all the way. But their performances away from home have not got better at all. As Moskowitz and Wertheim put it, ‘the home field advantage is almost eerily constant through time.’ You can do what you like to ensure your players do not suffer all the little inconveniences of being on the road – they are still liable to let you down when they arrive. (The one correlation Moskowitz and Wertheim do find between travel and performance is for those sports where away teams are sometimes forced to cram games together on a single road trip, meaning they have a tighter schedule than their opponents. This is true for US college basketball, where away sides are often disadvantaged by having to rush from town to town while the home teams get a day off – and in college basketball home court advantage runs as high as 69 per cent. But here the test is European soccer, where there are no scheduling anomalies, and where home teams win almost as often.)
What about local knowledge? Every ground is slightly different, so perhaps teams take advantage of their familiarity with their home environment. Even football pitches vary: some are wider, some are narrower, some are blowy, some are sheltered, some are rough, some are smooth. The differences are most noticeable in baseball, where some teams play at stadiums that suit hitters, and others at stadiums that suit pitchers (it’s a question of size, shape and atmospherics). Yet even in baseball, Moskowitz and Wertheim find it makes no difference. Teams that play in hitter-friendly stadiums do not outhit their opponents by any greater margin than teams that play in pitcher-friendly stadiums. This despite the fact that managers can pack the team with sluggers, sure that they will play at least half their games in advantageous conditions. Knowing what you need to do well in your own yard doesn’t help you do it any better. Home advantage seems to be entirely outside anyone’s power to control.
It’s not the crowd, it’s not the travel, it’s not the stadiums, it’s not the players or the managers. So what’s left? Well, there are always the referees (or umpires as they are known in most American sports). And that’s who it is – Moskowitz and Wertheim say home advantage is almost entirely down to the officials. Players aren’t put off by the barracking of the home fans, but the umpires are. It makes sense when you think about it – if tens of thousands of semi-hysterical people were scrutinising your performance, you’d want to try to please them if you could, if only subconsciously. The away players have nothing to gain from the home fans – if they do well they’ll get abuse, if they do badly they’ll get mockery. But the officials can make the home crowd happy and then surreptitiously bask in the warm glow. Away players can’t alleviate the pressure of being in a hostile environment. Referees can.
Moskowitz and Wertheim find plenty of evidence to back this up. In football, it turns out that referees consistently award more injury time when home teams are losing, and less when they are winning (on average, four minutes in the first case and two minutes in the second, enough to make a difference in plenty of matches). Home teams get far fewer players sent off, and receive many more free-kicks. Maybe this is down to the fact that the home side simply plays better and the away players are reduced to desperate measures. But Moskowitz and Wertheim find evidence that crowd effects make a real difference. In the German Bundesliga, for instance, where many of the teams used to play in stadiums incorporating running tracks, putting the crowd much further away from the action, the bias referees normally show to the home side was cut in half. In the British, Spanish and Italian leagues, attendance also has a marked effect on the number of red cards shown to the visitors. The bigger the crowd, the more likely the away team are to end up with fewer players on the pitch at the end.
However, the most compelling evidence for referee bias comes from those sports that have introduced technology to check on the decision-making of the officials. In baseball, a system called QuesTec (similar to Hawk-Eye in cricket and tennis) now shows whether a pitch was in the strike zone or not (the area over the home plate between a batter’s armpits and his knees). Moskowitz and Wertheim have looked at a mass of data and discovered that when a pitch is clearly a strike, baseball umpires do not advantage the home hitters. Equally, when a pitch is way outside the strike zone, they call it against the pitcher. But when it’s on the edges, the home team were
getting a large percentage of favourable calls. This shows two things. First, given the choice, umpires prefer to please the locals who are breathing down their necks (in many baseball stadiums almost literally). Second, they know what they are doing – they restrict their bias to areas where it won’t be so obvious (in stadiums that have installed QuesTec umpires have started to eliminate their home bias, now that they realise it’s there for all to see). Moskowitz and Wertheim find the same thing in ice hockey and American football, where the introduction of instant replay reviews showed that for close calls, and in tight games, the officials tend to favour the home team by a significant margin (calls against the away side are more likely to be corrected when impartial technology is called in evidence). Tight games are by definition the ones that can turn on one or two key decisions. And it appears that tight games are also the ones in which the officials go out of their way to help the home team. That’s enough for Wertheim and Moskowitz to finger them as almost entirely responsible for the phenomenon of home advantage.
It’s a lovely theory – simple, elegant and in tune with what most of us believe about human nature (and with what many fans have long suspected but never been able to prove about referees). There’s only one problem – it’s not true. I don’t doubt that referee bias has something to do with home advantage, but the idea that it’s the crucial determining factor is absurd. Just think about it – or rather, think twice about it. The first time you’re told it’s the referees you will probably go ‘aha!’, as I did. But the second time you’ll go ‘huh?’ Look at a football game. Yes, the home side does sometimes seem to get the benefit of the doubt from the referee, and yes, injury time does seem to go on for ever when Manchester United are playing at home – the image of Alex Ferguson consulting his watch as United push forward for a winning goal in the 97th minute at Old Trafford is probably the one that defines the Premier League. But why do the home side always seem more likely to score at the end? Why are they the ones pushing forward? Look, really look. It’s not just because the referee is letting them, it’s because something is making them play better. They believe.
At this point the freakonomists will tell me that I’m the one being absurd. The whole point of trusting to the numbers is that we can’t trust our eyes. We think we know what’s really going on only because we have all sorts of cognitive biases that lead us to misread individual situations. The freakonomics approach is designed to rule out what we assume is happening, forcing us to accept that we have been blinded to the truth by our preconceptions. Didn’t Moskowitz and Wertheim rule out all the plausible-seeming alternatives? Well, no they didn’t. They used the numbers to make it look like that was happening. But really they were just expressing their own bias. This is the trouble with the freakonomics approach. It’s not that the numbers misrepresent human nature by treating us all as twitchy little utility maximisers. Doubtless that’s what most of us are most of the time. The problem is that the freakonomists misrepresent the numbers.
Let’s spool back. Moskowitz and Wertheim claim that the performance of players from the free-throw line or the penalty spot shows the crowd doesn’t have an impact on the performance of the home team. But that’s not what it shows at all: it shows that the crowd doesn’t have an impact on individuals. What if home advantage is a team phenomenon? There is plenty of evidence not considered by Moskowitz and Wertheim to suggest that it is. British tennis players have never seemed to gain much advantage playing at Wimbledon, despite the presence of thousands of people willing balls that are in to be called out (I’m talking pre-Hawk-Eye here). Are phlegmatic British line judges somehow impervious to these pressures in a way that football referees are not? It’s not just us Brits. No Frenchman has won the French Open since 1983; no Australian has won the Australian Open since 1976. Where’s the home advantage? One explanation might be that playing at home really makes a difference only when you’re part of a team. It’s a collective experience, in which case it dissipates for isolated individuals (including the individuals standing at the free-throw line in a basketball game or at the penalty spot in a football match). Somehow, playing at home breeds a sense of solidarity, or what used to be called team spirit, which means that players have more confidence in each other and work better as a unit. I’m not saying that’s definitely what happens. But Moskowitz and Wertheim haven’t proved that it doesn’t.
The key figure that they don’t really discuss is the disparity between home advantage in baseball and football. Baseball has a relatively low home advantage ratio – the lowest for all major sports – at around 54 per cent for the major leagues. This is a huge difference from the 63-67 per cent that holds for the big European soccer leagues. What explains it? Moskowitz and Wertheim spend a lot of time describing how the bias of baseball umpires can account for almost all the home advantage in that sport – if it sways around 3 per cent of games (and they give good reasons for thinking that it does), then that’s practically the whole of it. But what about the extra 10 per cent in football? Their answer is that football is a sport where the referee’s decisions count for more. But they provide no statistics to support this. In fact, they read it backwards: since they are committed to their theory that referee bias accounts for home advantage, and since home advantage is much greater in football, QED referees must have more influence on the games. So who’s suffering from cognitive bias now?
What’s striking about Scorecasting is that there are numbers that could prove Moskowitz and Wertheim’s thesis, but they don’t provide them. Take the German case: if the presence of a running track cuts referee bias in half then it also ought to have cut the home advantage of the teams playing at those stadiums in half. Did it? They don’t say, but somehow I doubt it. Similarly, it should be possible to provide some numbers to decide the question of how much difference refereeing errors make to the outcome of football matches. Moskowitz and Wertheim don’t even try (all they tell us is when a team gets a player sent off, it is considerably more likely to lose – no kidding!). So I’ll have a stab, though I’m only guessing. Let’s say the mistakes of football referees favour the home side by a ratio of 60:40 (corresponding with the basic home advantage ratio). It also seems reasonable to believe that the mistakes of referees decide perhaps 20 per cent of all football matches. But that would still only give a home win advantage of 4 per cent. To get to 20 per cent it would either have to be the case that every refereeing error favoured the home side, or that every football game was decided by a refereeing error. That’s absurd. I am also prepared to believe that the extra 2 per cent of home advantage in Spain, and 4 per cent in Italy, is down to more suggestible referees (though whether it’s the crowds that are influencing them or something more sinister is open to question). But whichever way you spin it, it seems that the bulk of home advantage in football is still unexplained by refereeing bias.
So here’s an alternative explanation: home advantage is lower for baseball because it’s less of a team sport. It’s primarily a series of individual encounters between batters and pitchers. It’s more like tennis than like football. Playing at home makes the biggest difference to passing sports, where the players have to rely on each other. (There is some passing in baseball, from fielder to fielder, but much less than in football or other sports where home advantage is very pronounced, like basketball and ice hockey.) Baseball is also a more disjointed sport (again like tennis): it consists of lots of discrete plays. Team spo
rts where the action flows are the ones in which playing at home really counts. Why? I’m not sure. But Moskowitz and Wertheim have not ruled it out.
I can’t prove my theory, but I can defend it. It chimes with what you can see happening in any team sport – the away players don’t quite believe in themselves in the way the home players do. This is especially true near the end of a close game between two otherwise evenly matched teams, when the home side will usually be the one pressing for a winner. Moskowitz and Wertheim say that’s because the referee is allowing it to happen: what we think is a quality belonging to the players is actually a quality we have misattributed to them because of the indulgence of the officials. But that’s not really convincing – not only does it not tally with the evidence of our own eyes (the home team attacks even during the periods when the referee has no influence on the game) but it doesn’t fit with another claim they make in Scorecasting. As well as identifying a bias in favour of the home side, they also show that officials prefer to avoid making decisions that might make them stand out, especially near the end of a game. This is a widespread phenomenon, and it applies to football as much as any other sport. As Moskowitz and Wertheim report, having studied 15 years of data from the Premier League, La Liga and Serie A: ‘Fouls, offsides and free kicks diminish significantly as close matches draw to a close.’ This is the ‘omission’ bias, and we all tend to suffer from it – we prefer to let bad things happen than to take a chance on doing the right thing and risk carrying the can. If a referee intervenes in a game near the end, it looks like he’s deciding the outcome. That’s going to make some people mad.
Moskowitz and Wertheim describe a classic sporting example of what can happen when an official tries to overcome his or her omission bias. At the 2009 US Open a brave/foolhardy tennis line judge called a foot-fault against Serena Williams at the climax of her semi-final against Kim Clijsters. Subsequent replays showed the call was correct. But it provoked outrage. Line judges rarely call foot-faults, since they don’t want to look conspicuous. What was this one doing interposing herself at such a crucial moment in the match and helping to decide the outcome? Just doing her job? Come on – she was making a spectacle of herself. After she had been foot-faulted, Williams turned on the official and screamed at her: ‘You better be fucking right! You don’t fucking know me! … If I could, I would take this fucking ball and shove it down your fucking throat!’ This outburst meant Williams was docked a point, which cost her the match. The crowd went crazy. John McEnroe commentating on television, agreed: ‘You can’t call that there. Not at that point in the match.’ So it turns out it didn’t matter that the line judge was fucking right; she was still run out of town.
As Moskowitz and Wertheim show, most officials have internalised these sorts of lesson. They don’t like to interpose themselves at crucial moments, when people can say: it was the goddam ump! They don’t even like to make calls at any point in a game when their decision will stand out. So, for instance, in baseball, when an umpire has made three consecutive calls against the pitcher, meaning one more ‘ball’ (a pitch called outside the strike-zone) will give the batter a free walk to first base, he usually shies away from making the call. Better to call a strike, so it doesn’t look like the umpire has dominated that little period of play. This has important implications. It’s a truism of baseball coaching that when hitters are at 3-0 (three balls, no strikes) they shouldn’t swing at the next pitch. Don’t waste a dominant position. Make the pitcher, who is under all the pressure, get it over the plate. But in fact the umpire, who’s really the one under pressure, will probably see the ball as going over the plate regardless of whether it is or not. So the truism is false – you’re better off swinging. This lesson can be applied to many areas of life. Say you’re going to a job interview. You know you’re the outstanding candidate, so you decide to play it safe. But if you really are the outstanding candidate, the umpires are unlikely to want to strike you out on the basis of a single interview. So you might as well swing for the fences …